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is paper examines the justication for the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC).
HEC claims that human cognitive processes can, and oen do, extend outside our
head to include objects in the environment. HEC has been justied by inference to the
best explanation (IBE). Both advocates and critics of HEC claim that we can infer the
truth value of HEC based on whether HEC makes a positive or negative explanatory
contribution to cognitive science. I argue that IBE cannot play this epistemic role. A
serious rival to HEC exists with a diering truth value, and this invalidates IBEs for
both the truth and the falsity of HEC. Explanatory value to cognitive science is not a
guide to the truth value of HEC.
1 Introduction
How much of your mind is inside your head?e hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC)
claims that important aspects of one’s mental life spill outside one’s head into objects in the
environment. It is commonly remarked that personal computers, calendars, notebooks,
and to-do lists play a pervasive role in our lives. Such objects are in intimate feedback with
our thought processes, and they guide our action in direct, and oen undeliberated, ways.
HEC claims that these intimate and action-guiding relationships result in those external
objects being part of our cognitive processes. A uently deployed laptop computer, iPhone,
Filofax, or diary may be part of the substrate of one’s mental life, in a similar manner as
the neural resources inside one’s head. External objects can, just like one’s neural activity,
constitute the realisation base of one’s cognitive processes.
HEC appears to entail a radical refactoring of the mind as it is conceived in psychology,
cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. If HEC is right, then those disciplines as
traditionally pursued mistake their subject matter. e mind is not located inside the
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organism, but spread between the organism and environment. If one wishes to describe
the present state of the organism’s mind, or the evolution of the organism’s mind over time,
onemust describe the organism plus its environment. A psychology or philosophy ofmind
that conned itself only to cognitive activity inside the organism would be impoverished
along roughly the same lines as a psychology that conned itself to only one part of the
brain.
One of the most inuential strategies for arguing for HEC has been inference to the best
explanation (IBE).1 On this view, HEC is justied by its explanatory pay-o for cognitive
science. e explanatory virtues of HEC for the practice of cognitive science argue for
HEC’s truth. IBE counsels to infer the hypothesis that best explains the data, provided that
explanation meets some minimum standard for adequacy. According to Lipton (2004),
IBE is central to inferential practice in science. Lipton distinguishes between two types of
IBE: ‘Inference to the Likeliest Explanation’ and ‘Inference to the Loveliest Explanation’.
Inference to the Likeliest Explanation accurately describes our aspirations—we typically
wish to infer the likeliest explanation—but by itself it is uninformative, it is not an eective
epistemic strategy because it gives us no clue how to work out which hypothesis is the
likeliest. A version of IBE that we are capable of acting on is Inference to the Loveliest
Explanation. Inference to the Loveliest Explanation says that explanatory properties are a
guide to likeliness. Inference to the Loveliest Explanation counsels to infer the hypothesis
that provides the best (loveliest) explanation, where loveliest is understood in terms of
explanatory properties like scope, simplicity, unication, fruitfulness, and mechanisation.
An advocate of IBE claims that these properties, which make for a lovely explanation, are
also a guide to truth.2
Instances of IBE are not hard to nd. Ine Origin of Species, Darwin cited a large array
of facts, including the geographical distribution of species and the existence of atrophied
organs, that are elegantly explained by the theory of evolution by natural selection, but
poorly explained, or not explained at all, by rival hypotheses. In the sixth edition, Darwin
wrote:
It can hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain, in so satisfactory
a manner as does the theory of natural selection, the several large classes
of facts above specied. It has recently been objected that this is an unsafe
method of arguing; but it is a method used in judging of the common events
of life, and has oen been used by the greatest natural philosophers.
(Darwin 1962, p. 476)
Similarly, Lavoisier argued that we should posit a new chemical principle, oxygen, because
of the explanatory benets it would bring:
I have deduced all the explanations from a simple principle, that pure or
vital air is composed of a principle particular to it, which forms its base, and
which I have named the oxygen principle, combined with the matter of re
and heat. Once this principle was admitted, the main diculties of chemistry
1. Clark (2007, 2008); Clark and Chalmers (1998).
2. Lipton (2004), pp. 59–62, 122.
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appeared to dissipate and vanish, and all the phenomena were explained with
an astonishing simplicity. (Lavoiser 1862, p. 623)
And Fresnel argued that the wave theory of light should be preferred to its rival, New-
ton’s particle theory, because the wave theory better explains reection, refraction, and
diraction:
us reection, refraction, all the cases of diraction, colored rings in oblique
incidences as in perpendicular incidences, the remarkable agreement between
the thicknesses of air and of water which produce the same rings; all these
phenomena, which require somany particular hypotheses inNewton’s system,
are reunited and explained by the theory of vibrations and inuences of rays
on each other. (Fresnel 1866, p. 36)3
IBE appears to have played an important epistemic role in some of our most prized
scientic inferences. IBE may not be the only way in which a scientic hypothesis is
supported, but it does appear to have the ability to confer signicant epistemic warrant.
Supporters of HEC argue that the best explanation of the evidence in cognitive science
is the truth of HEC. HEC provides the most unied, fruitful, and elegant explanation of
the empirical data. Hence, we should infer that HEC is true. Opponents of HEC employ
IBE to argue for HEC’s falsity.4 ey argue that HEC contributes negative explanatory
value to cognitive science, and hence we should infer that HEC is false, since its falsity
would better explain the data than its truth. Both critics and advocates of HEC agree that
HEC’s explanatory value is a guide to its truth value.ey disagree about the direction in
which the explanatory guide points: whether HEC’s explanatory contribution to cognitive
science is positive or negative. If positive, we should infer HEC’s truth; if negative, we
should infer HEC’s falsity.
In this paper, I argue that both critics and advocates of HEC are mistaken. IBE fails as a
way both of arguing for HEC, and as a way of criticising HEC.e reason is a common
source of failure with IBE: the existence of a hypothesis that is a serious explanatory rival
with a diering truth value. IBE is highly sensitive to the competitive context. Introducing
the right kind of rival can dramatically alter the result of explanatory competitions and
invalidate plausible IBEs, even if the empirical ‘evidence’ has not changed.5 A reasonable
IBE in one context may be rendered invalid if a better, or an equally good, rival explanation
is introduced. I argue that once the right rival to HEC is considered, one can see that IBE
cannot do the epistemic work that it has been claimed to do. Advocates and critics of
HEC have won an unjustied sheen of plausibility for their arguments by shielding them
from appropriate rivals. Once these rivals are introduced, HEC is simply not sensitive to
the empirical practice of cognitive science in a way that an IBE based on that practice can
bring to bear. HEC should be criticised or supported in other ways.
3. e quotations are taken fromagard (1978) using his translation.
4. Adams and Aizawa (2007); Aizawa (2007); Rupert (2004, 2009a, 2009b).
5. Cf. van Fraassen (1980)’s strategy for defanging the miracle argument for scientic realism by intro-
ducing a rival Darwinian explanation of the success of scientic theories.
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e argument of this paper, although primarily about the status of HEC, should interest a
wider constituency than just fans and critics of extended cognition.e argument is an
illustration of pitfalls with an increasingly common naturalistic move in philosophy of
mind. In some quarters, there is a tendency to appeal to scientic practice as the ultimate
arbiter of hypotheses.is extreme, knee-jerk, naturalism mistakenly treats contingent
features of scientic practice with a higher degree of reverence than they deserve, or than
scientists themselves would accord. One cannot read o metaphysics from science, or
reduce metaphysical questions to questions of scientic practice. e argument below
aims to show that the judgements of science (even a future cognitive science) are, by
themselves, too limited to decide the extent of our mental life.
Lipton distinguishes between descriptive and normative questions concerning IBE.e
descriptive question is: does IBE provide an accurate description of the actual inferential
practices in science?e normative question is: does IBE propose an inferential method
that is likely to take us to the truth?is paper primarily concerns the normative dimen-
sion of IBE.e question is whether explanatory value to cognitive science gives us a
reason to infer the truth/falsity of HEC. One way of approaching this question would be
to ask whether IBE is generally a reliable form of inference. In this paper, I wish to grant
for the sake of argument IBE the status of being generally trustworthy. I wish to see if on
the most sympathetic understanding of IBE it supports the arguments for and against
HEC. Moreover, although the focus of this paper is the normative project, it also contrib-
utes to the descriptive project by highlighting specic properties accorded explanatory
signicance in cognitive science.
2 HEC
A tempting picture of the mind is of an entity that could, in principle, be divorced from
the world and yet remain largely untouched. Descartes explored consequences of this
picture when he considered the possibility that the world might be radically dierent,
while one’s mind remains the same. On such a view, one’s mind causally interacts with the
environment (via reliable or unreliable channels), but it is constituted largely independently
of that environment.e mind could, in principle, be transplanted without signicant loss
into an impoverished environment.is picture has been undermined from a number of
directions.
First, it faces the challenge of content externalism. Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979, 1986)
argue that the content of certain beliefs and other mental states depends on distal features
of one’s environment and one’s history. An exact physical duplicate in another environ-
ment may have dierent mental contents solely in virtue of its dierent surroundings. A
second challenge is the possibility of factive mental states. Williamson (2000) argues that
knowledge is one among many factive mental states. A factive state has true contents,
and consequently factive mental states (knowing, perceiving, remembering, etc.) can
depend both on how things are inside our head, and on how things are in the environ-
ment. Changes in one’s environment can change one’s factive mental states (e.g. transform
knowledge to mere belief) without any concomitant internal changes.
HEC challenges the internalist picture from another direction. According to HEC, the
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environment plays an intimate and pervasive role in constituting the mechanisms of
cognitive processing. An important part of the internalist picture is the assumption
that one’s mental states and processes somehow take place in one’s neural tissue or body.
ere are a variety of ways in which this internalist thought can be given content. An
identity theorist may claim that mental states are identical to brain states and hence, in a
robust sense, are located inside the head. A functionalist may claim that mental states
are realised by brain states, and so are similarly associated with an internal location. A
property dualist may claim thatmental properties are instantiated in the brain and nervous
system, or in the whole human organism, and hence although non-physical, closely tied
to an internal location. Even a substance dualist like Descartes can make sense of the
thought that cognition is an internal process: the location at which mental states enter
the physical world—the pineal gland—is robustly inside the head. For the internalist,
if the mechanisms of mental processes lie anywhere in space at all, they lie within the
skin. HEC claims that this picture is wrong. Environmental processes support our mental
activity in exactly the same way as internal activity. Our mental states are constituted in,
or realised by, or instantiated by, environmental processes just as they are constituted in,
or realised by, or instantiated by, neural processes. Environmental activity forms part of
the mechanisms of one’s mind in the same way as one’s neural activity.
In contrast to content externalism, HEC makes a claim about the location of the vehicles,
not the content, of mental states. Putnam’s and Burge’s externalism assumed that the
vehicles of mental states were neural even if the factors that determined their content were
external. In contrast to externalism about factive mental states, HEC can apply to any
aspect of one’s mental life, not just factive states like knowing or perceiving. HEC is also
distinctively active in a way that the other two forms of externalism are not. Environmental
features generally play an action-guiding role in HEC. Changes in the environment can
trigger changes in the way in which thoughts are processed, which can cause changes
in the behaviour of the cognitive agent. As far as the other forms of externalism are
concerned, although the environment can aect the content or factive status of a mental
state, the mental state’s action-guiding role typically remains untouched.6
In order to state HEC, a trivial and a non-trivial way in which the mind could depend
on the environment should be distinguished. e trivial form of dependence is causal
dependence. e human brain causally depends on an endocrine system, blood supply,
and being in an oxygen-rich environment.is does not, by itself, make the endocrine
system, blood supply, or environmental oxygen part of the brain. Similarly, our mental
states causally depend on the environment for their input: we would not enjoy the rich
mental life we do if it were not for the environmental sensory input. However, this kind
of dependence is compatible with mental activity being wholly internal. An internalist
may admit that our mental states causally depend on the environment, but claim that the
environment is needed only insofar as it provides input that brings about the right internal
states, which are the true locus of mental activity. On such a view, the environment plays
only an instrumental role in causing cognitive states to occur.7
HEC makes a stronger claim: the dependence of the mind on the environment is not just
causal, it is also constitutive.e mechanisms of one’s mind are partially made up from
6. See Clark and Chalmers (1998), p. 9; Clark (2009); Hurley (2010).
7. See Hurley (2010).
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the environment, in a similar way as the mechanisms of one’s mind are partially made
up from activity in one’s auditory cortex. Rather than being merely instrumental non-
mental input, environmental states are part of the cognitive mechanism. In functionalist
terms, cognitive mechanisms are jointly realised in both environmental activity and neural
activity without any dierence in kind, cognitive or mental, between the environmental
and neural parts. Environmental activity is more than a convenient way of bringing about
the right internal states, it is part of the mechanism of certain cognitive processes, and a
necessary precondition for certain cognitive processes to exist at all.
Unsurprisingly, justifying whether something is a cause or a constitutive part of a mental
process is far from easy. Initially, advocates of HEC appeared to argue for a constitutive
relationship with the environment based on ‘close-coupling’ arguments.ey pointed out
the existence of tight causal loops criss-crossing between the mind and certain features in
the environment, and claimed that because of the tightness of these loops, we should infer
that those environmental features are part of the mind.8 Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2007)
objected that this form of reasoning commits what they call the ‘coupling–constitution
fallacy’. Just because x and y are tightly causally coupled, that does not show that x is part
of y, or that y is part of x. A bimetallic strip inside a thermostat is tightly causally coupled
to the motion of atoms in the surrounding air, but that does not show that expansion of
the strip is a process that extends into the atoms in the air. Adams and Aizawa argue that
the limits of the causal–constitutive boundary should instead be decided by what they call
amark of the cognitive: a general theory that species what makes something a cognitive
process. Adams & Aizawa proposed two necessary conditions as part of such a theory: a
cognitive process should involve non-derived content, and it should have a ne-grained
causal structure similar to that of actual human cognitive processes. Both criteria have
been criticised.9ere is currently no consensus on what should count as a mark of the
cognitive.
e result has been a stalemate concerning whether coupling arguments for HEC are
successful or not. No proposed mark of the cognitive has proved less controversial than
the cases that it is supposed to decide.10 In order to break this stalemate, there has been a
recent turn to scientic practice. Despite our lack of agreement on a theoretical mark of
the cognitive, psychology makes decisions all the time about whether a causal process
is an input to a cognitive process or a part of the cognitive process. We appear to have
an implicit grasp of the causal–constitutive split from the typings of cognitive processes
that are arrived at in psychology.ese typings are governed in large part by questions of
8. Attributing this argument to Clark and Chalmers (1998) has become common, but it not unprob-
lematic because the causal/constitutive distinction was not explicitly drawn at the time.e argument is
attributed based on their discussion of coupling in §§3,4. See Adams and Aizawa (2007), pp. 89–90 for
discussion.
9. See Clark (2005, 2010) on the non-derived content condition and Clark (2010); Sprevak (2009) on
the causal structure condition. Rupert (2009a, 2009b) proposes another mark of the cognitive—cognitive
processes are persisting sets of integrated packages—also controversial, but discussion of which would
take us too far aeld.
10. Notably, stalemate does not mean that internalism wins by default. To assume this would be to
commit whatHurley (2010) calls the ‘causal–constitutive error error’: claiming thatHEC gives an unjustied
constitutive role to external factors, while assuming without independent justication that the constitutive
boundary falls inside the skin. If neither camp can draw the causal/constitutive boundary, why assume
that it favours internalism?
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explanatory value: whether a process is typed as two processes or a single psychological
process depends on what best serves the interests of psychological explanations. is
explanatory practice promises to provide a way of demarcating the causal–constitutive
split. Hurley nicely summarises the strategy:
Criteria of the mental vary widely (if not wildly) across dierent theorists;
it isn’t even clear what agreed work such criteria should do. Yet psychology
continues on its way with a rough and ready sense of what it wants to explain,
generating good explanations.e issues between internalism and external-
ism should resolved bottom up by such scientic practice, not by advance
metaphysics: by seeing whether any good psychological explanations are
externalist, not by deciding on a criterion of the mental and using it to sort ex-
planations as constitutive or not. In this context, I’m aware of no appropriate
criterion independent of good explanations. (Hurley 2010, pp. 106–107)
In a similar vein, Clark (2007) argues that some coupling relations (self-stimulating
loops), but not others, serve as single explanatory units in psychology, and thereby have a
constitutive rather than merely causal role (pp. 184–185). Adams and Aizawa (2007) and
Rupert (2009a, 2009b), in addition to proposing theoretical marks of the cognitive, argue
that those marks should be justied by the explanatory practice of psychology.11 Chalmers,
aer considering a purely causal gloss of external factors, says: ‘Ultimately, the proof is in
the pudding.e deepest support for [externalism] comes from the explanatory insights
that the extended mind perspective yields’ (Chalmers 2008, p. 16).
e close-coupling argument initially appeared to be distinct from the direct IBEs for
HEC described below, now it appears to rest on explanatory concerns.erefore, in recent
years IBE has become increasingly important in debates about HEC. IBE arguments have
to do double duty. First, argue directly for the truth of HEC based on its explanatory
pay-o (as described below). Second, settle whether the coupling relations involved are
constitutive or merely causal. IBE has taken centre stage as one of the key arguments for
and against HEC. It is to these IBE arguments that we now turn.
3 Finding HEC’s explanatory rivals
Inference to the best explanation counsels to infer the best among all the explanations we
can generate of the data (provided that best explanation is good enough).e competition
between explanations should be free and fair: we should not bias the eld by deliberately
ignoring certain known alternatives. In other words, for an IBE to be valid it is not enough
that a hypothesis beat some competitors, it should beat all known competitors. For if a
better explanation were in hand, it would have a stronger claim to be inferred.
ere is no guarantee that we have the best explanation in hand. At a givenmoment, we can
only think of a limited number of explanations. If IBE is to be an eective epistemic strategy,
11. ‘In the end empirical research should decide this question: we should commit resources to the
framework of extended cognitive systems, apply the extended view in the study and the lab, and see
whether doing so generates a ourishing research program in cognitive science’ (Rupert 2004, p. 425).
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it should, at most, counsel us to infer the best explanation we can currently generate; it
cannot ask us to do the impossible. is raises the possibility that tomorrow we may
think of a new explanation that upsets a previous explanatory competition. Consequently,
inferences to the best explanation are defeasible, in at least two ways. First, new data
coming in can aect the success or failure of existing explanations. An existing explanation
may become more or less plausible in the light of new data. Second, creating a new
explanation can defeat a previous IBE by usurping the title of best explanation. A plausible
IBE can be rendered invalid by the introduction of a new competitor, even in the absence
of any new data. In the next two sections, I argue that creating the right competing
hypothesis defeats IBEs both for and against HEC.
What are the competing explanations to HEC?
One competitor to HEC is a version of internalism that I call the hypothesis of internal
cognition (HINT). According to HINT, psychological processes do not extend outside the
head, and they can be explained and studied largely in isolation from their environment.
e input and output of a psychological process may be located in the environment, but
the specication and explanation of psychological mechanisms is largely a story about
internal activity. Just as the explanation of the mechanisms of a personal computer is
typically given irrespective of the environment in which the computer is located (save for
specication of its inputs and outputs), so the explanation of the mechanisms of human
psychology should be given largely irrespective of the environment in which the organism
happens to be located.is is not to say that under HINT no explanation of psychological
mechanisms would appeal to the environment.e environment will undoubtedly play a
role in answering why we have certain cognitive processes (e.g. as part of an evolutionary
story, or a developmental story). But the specication and explanation of what those
psychological processes are is nevertheless a story about internal mechanisms.12
HINT’s inuences run deep and are evident in psychological explanation at least as far
back as Descartes. Post-war psychology has been particularly heavily inuenced by HINT,
not least because it ts naturally with the model of the mind as a computer.13 HINT
enjoys obvious appeal: we appear to carry our cognitive mechanisms around with us,
and we appear to be capable of deploying our cognitive mechanisms across dierent
environments. Surely then our cognitive mechanisms are internal to us, and their study
a matter of specifying internal processes? HINT has consequences for psychological
practice: it makes cognitive science particularly apt for laboratory work and analyses that
abstract cognitive mechanisms from their natural environment.14
HEC and HINT are rivals, but HINT is not the only rival to HEC. Another is introduced
by Rupert (2004): the hypothesis of embedded cognition (HEMC).15 Like HEC, HEMC
claims that cognition depends intimately, and oen in unexpected ways, on external
props and the structure of the environment. Like HEC, HEMC claims that an adequate
12. Cf. Marr (1982)’s distinction between (i) the ‘ecological’ question of why we have certain cognitive
processes (answered at the ‘computational level’), and (ii) how those cognitive processes work (answered
by a mechanistic story at the ‘algorithmic level’), and for which, unlike (i), an internalist story is told.
13. Cf. Fodor (1980)’s methodological solipsism.
14. See Chirimuuta and Gold (2009).
15. Rupert develops HEMC fromMcClamrock (1995). I take liberties with developing Rupert’s version
of HEMC.
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specication and explanation of those cognitive mechanisms should be a complex story
involving both internal activity and environmental activity. HEMC agrees with HEC
that the environment is not just a net input or output of a cognitive process, it can be
an essential part of the intermediate processing.e one point on which HEMC diers
from HEC is that HEMC does not claim that the relevant environmental features are
thereby mental or cognitive. HEMC agrees with HEC about the respects in which the
environment enters into psychological explanation; but it departs from HEC in that it
does not take on HEC’s claim that those environmental features are also mental.
HEMC splits two claims that are combined in statements of HEC and HINT: a claim
about cognitivemechanisms and a claim about themechanistic explanation of cognition.
HEMC does not claim that the mechanisms of cognition are external; it only claims that
the mechanistic explanation of how psychological processes work is not a purely internal
story. Such a split need not be peculiar to cognition. For instance, one might think that the
mechanisms of the human liver are internal to the liver, but that those mechanisms are so
bound up with other bodily systems that the story about how they work cannot be served
by a purely internal narrative. Similarly, an advocate of HEMCmay claim that cognitive
mechanisms are internal, but that the mechanistic explanation of how they work is a
complex story involving both internal activity and environmental resources. According
to HEMC, one’s cognitive processes stop at the skull, but a description of what takes place
inside the skull is not sucient as an explanation of how one’s cognitive mechanisms
work.
HEMC has similar consequences to HEC for the way in which psychology should be
practised. HEMC colours one’s view of what goes on inside the thinking subject and opens
up the possibility that the subject ‘o-loads’ some of the work involved in cognition onto
environmental resources, so that she can get away with simpler internal mental processes,
or internal processes of a dierent character. e study of psychological mechanisms
according to HEMC should not just be a study of internal activity but include how we
exploit features of the environment. In contrast, HINT requires that nearly all the work of
cognition be done in the head. A HEMC-based psychologist can explain how a cognitive
process works by showing how interaction with the environment is harnessed as part of
the cognitive processing, it does not—as HINT does—adopt a picture where only internal
processing is relevant to the explanation of the mechanisms of cognition.
HEC, HEMC, and HINT are three competing hypotheses. HEMC claims that extra-
cranial features play an essential role in the specication and explanation of cognitive
mechanisms. HEC claims that those same features play that same role, and they are
also mental. HINT claims that the extra-cranial features are neither mental nor play
an essential role in explaining how cognitive processes work (save for functioning as
inputs or outputs to the mechanism, or as general background conditions for the internal
mechanisms to function at all).
It is worth distinguishing between a stronger and a weaker version of HEMC. Strictly
speaking, the version of HEMC described above (and given by Rupert (2004)) is com-
patible with HEC.is version of HEMC does not deny that cognition extends, it just
does not, unlike HEC, arm it.is raises a potential puzzle for IBE arguments. IBE is
a mechanism for selecting among rivals, but HEC and HEMC are logically compatible,
and so are not genuine rivals. A way around this diculty, the way adopted by Rupert
9
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and others, is to combine HEMC with a form of internalism, and so have an overall
package of views claiming that cognitive mechanisms are internal.is seems the best
way of interpreting HEMC: the purpose of HEMC is to gain the benets of HEC, but keep
cognition internal. Alternative interpretations are unpromising: combining HEMC with
HEC does not result in a new position, and combining HEMC with agnosticism about
internalism/externalism does not yield an IBE candidate capable of showing that HEC is
true or false.erefore, at least for the purposes of IBE arguments, I will construe HEMC
as a variety of internalism.
4 Explanatory value arguments for HEC
Clark and Chalmers (1998) give the following IBE for HEC:
By embracing an active externalism [HEC], we allow a more natural explana-
tion of all sorts of actions. One can explain my choice of words in Scrabble,
for example, as the outcome of an extended cognitive process involving the
rearrangement of tiles on my tray. Of course, one could always try to explain
my action in terms of internal processes and a long series of ‘inputs’ and
‘actions’, but this explanation would be needlessly complex. (pp. 9–10)
In this case, Clark and Chalmers claim that a psychological explanation should not just
focus on the internal activity that gives rise to behaviour, but also on the ways in which
cognitive activity relies on the structure of the environment to achieve the cognitive agent’s
ends.e way in which I rearrange my Scrabble tiles is not just a behavioural output, but
a strategy on my part of structuring the world to help me think.e intended contrast is
between explaining mental activity in purely internal terms, and giving a mixed story in
terms of a mechanism that includes both internal activity and environmental props.
If successful, this IBE may target HINT, but it does not discriminate between HEC and
HEMC. Both HEMC and HEC acknowledge that an internal story is insucient to
explain all psychological processes, and both hypotheses acknowledge that cognitive
processes rely on the structure of the environment. Clark andChalmers’ ‘active externalism’
mode of explanation is available in both cases. Furthermore, it is far from clear what
additional explanatory benet is gained by HEC’s claim that the Scrabble tiles aremental
or cognitive, rather than saying, as HEMC does, that they are non-mental props essential
to the explanation of successful cognition.erefore, the IBE above may select between
HINT and HEC or HEMC, but it does not select between HEC and HEMC, and so does
not tell distinctively in favour of HEC.
Another argument fromClark and Chalmers is more promising. I call this the transcranial
kinds argument. Clark and Chalmers present two cases of supposed belief. e rst
involves Inga, a normal human subject who hears of an exhibition at the Museum of
Modern Art (MoMA). Inga thinks, recalls that MoMA is on 53rd St., and sets o. Otto,
who suers from a mild form of Alzheimer’s and always writes down useful information
in his notebook, also hears of the exhibition. Otto retrieves the address from his notebook,
and sets o.
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Clark and Chalmers claim that these two cases fall under a common psychological explan-
ation. Just as Inga arrived at 53rd St. because she wanted to go to MoMA and believed that
it was there, so Otto arrived at 53rd St. because he wanted to go to MoMA and believed
that it was there. e state that functioned as Otto’s belief was not entirely inside his
head—it was spread between his neural activity and his notebook—but that state still
combined with Otto’s desires and drove his action in the same way as Inga’s internal belief.
According to Clark and Chalmers, treating Otto’s extended state as a belief unies the
psychological explanation of Otto and Inga in a valuable way. It allows one to see a
common psychological action at work, irrespective of whether the agent relies only on
internal resources, or o-loads work onto the environment. Moreover, the alternative—
explaining Otto’s success in terms of his internal beliefs about the notebook—seems
needlessly complex. e notebook is a constant in Otto’s life, just like Inga’s internal
memory. It appears redundant to point to Otto’s notebook in every explanation of his
action. A common pattern of belief–desire explanation beckons in both cases. Positing
extended beliefs provides the best—most unied and most elegant—explanation of the
agents’ behaviour:16
By using the ‘belief ’ notion in a wider way, it picks out something more akin
to a natural kind. e notion becomes deeper and more unied, and it is
more useful in explanation. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 14)
Clark and Chalmers claim that by introducing psychological kinds that cross-cut the
organism’s boundary—transcranial cognitive kinds—cognitive science becomes more
powerful and unied.e explanatory value of transcranial cognitive kinds is given as an
argument for their existence.
One way of objecting to this IBE argument for HEC is to argue that transcranial kinds
do not bring such reputed explanatory benets to cognitive science. is is the route
pursued by Rupert (2004).17 Rupert argues that the valuable generalisations in cognitive
science concern the particular methods by which individual subjects access and process
information. A psychology that treats internal and transcranial cases as of the same
psychological kindwill, by necessity, be uninformative about the details of those individual
methods. In order for Otto and Inga to instantiate the same psychological kind, the ne-
grained details of their individual memory mechanisms have to be glossed over. But
according to Rupert, those ne-grained details are precisely what cognitive science should
uncover. Consequently, adding transcranial kinds obstructs progress in cognitive science
rather than aids it.
As Rupert admits, the problem with this objection is that an advocate of HEC is not
committed to dispensing with individualistic or ne-grained cognitive kinds, only to
adding transcranial kinds to the explanatory resources of cognitive science. It is no part
of HEC to outlaw traditional psychology or ignore the ne-grained ways in which Otto
and Inga dier. Rather, HEC’s claim is that traditional individualistic psychology should
be seen as part of a wider story about the recruitment of resources that may or may not
16. Clark and Chalmers (1998), pp. 12–14.
17. See for example, pp. 420–421.
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be internal. An advocate of HEC can agree with Rupert that Otto and Inga dier in
their ne-grained memory details, and that in certain contexts such dierences matter a
great deal to psychological explanation. Her claim is that in addition to those ne-grained
dierences, Otto and Inga share an overarching mental kind.
Another diculty with a at-footed denial that transcranial kinds have explanatory value is
that transcranial kinds fall under a wider explanatory strategy in psychology. Psychologists
oen ‘black-box’ a cognitive mechanism and abstract away its details. Black-boxing is
established as a useful explanatory manoeuvre. It allows one to see a common architecture
at work, and common mechanisms shared between dierent sub-systems. It has become
a primary strategy in understanding how human psychology works. If ignoring ne-
grained details, black-boxing, is valid in internal cases, why not in extended cases too?
Black-boxing promises to capture an account of the action involved when humans rely
on, and switch between, internal and external memory resources.is does not rule out a
supplementary account of the dierences between those memory resources. But it adds
the ability to understand a higher-level pattern that they share. Humans appear to switch
between information stored internally and information o-loaded onto environmental
resources. Transcranial kinds allow one to understand how there could be a common
architecture at work governing this process.18
I argue that the problem with transcranial kinds is not, as Rupert contends, that they are
explanatorily worthless, but that whatever explanatory value transcranial kinds bring to
cognitive science, they do not select between HEC and HEMC.
Clark and Chalmers’ transcranial kinds argument for HEC relies on the assumption
that transcranial kinds are mental kinds. But what is the explanatory value in believing
this? Suppose that transcranial kinds are hybrid kinds: part mental, part non-mental.
Hybrid kinds are compatible with HEMC. Hybrid kinds also appear equipped to take
on the explanatory duties described above. e explanatory benets that Clark and
Chalmers describe for transcranial kinds stem from their transcranial nature, not from
their supposedly mental nature. Indeed, it is far from clear that transcranial kinds being
mental or cognitive does any explanatory work at all.
Clark and Chalmers claim that transcranial kinds unify the psychological explanation of
Otto and Inga. But this unied form of explanation is available under either the hybrid
kind or puremental kind hypotheses. In both cases, one can assert that Otto and Inga share
a psychologically-signicant state. Why should this state be 100% mental in both cases?
In order to achieve unied explanation, it is sucient they share some psychologically-
signicant state, and hence fall under same psychological explanation. It is a further
question whether what they share is mental or a mix of mental and non-mental elements
in each case.
Notably, being psychologically-signicant is not sucient to make a state mental. Psycho-
logy contains a mix of mental and non-mental elements signicant for explanation: for
example, the causes and eects of mental states are oen not mental themselves, and yet
are still signicant in psychological explanations. If transcranial kinds are to be included
in the taxonomy of cognitive psychology, why assume that they fall cleanly under the
18. See Gray and Fu (2004); Gray et al. (2006), Ballard, Hayhoe and Pelz (1995); Ballard et al. (1997), and
the discussion below for examples of this kind of work in psychology.
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heading of pure mental states?
Inga’s psychological state is not identical in all respects to Otto’s psychological state. In
order to satisfy the same psychological explanation they must share some features in
common. But why assume that their common properties include a sharedmental nature,
rather than, say, a shared role in driving action under a relatively abstract description?
e explanatory value to cognitive science comes from positing a transcranial state that
has certain psychologically-signicant features, not from assuming that such a state is
wholly mental.19
Transcranial kinds allow one to illustrate a common psychological architecture across
dierences in resources, internal or external. But a description of a common architecture
can be given without settling whether the resource abstracted over is mental in both cases.
In some instances, a recall mechanismmight take advantage of mental resources, in others
it might use a non-mental resource.e explanatory value of transcranial kinds comes
from allowing us to generalise about how mental processes involve, and switch between,
internal and external resources. It does not derive from the assumption that the resource
involved in each case is mental.
Transcranial kinds allow us to explain Otto’s success without repeatedly mentioning his be-
liefs about his notebook. But again this leaves open whether the state responsible for Otto’s
success is mental. All that is required is that Otto and Inga share some psychologically-
signicant features responsible for their successful action. As indicated above, this is
available on either hypothesis.
A nal potential explanatory benet of transcranial kinds is that they allow one to classify
traditional sensory input, internal state, behavioural output cycles as single explanatory
units in psychology. But treating entire sensorimotor loops as single explanatory units is
compatible with holding that the input and output sections of the loops are non-mental,
albeit psychologically signicant. An advocate of HEMC can obtain whatever explanatory
benets are to be gained by appealing to whole loops as single explanatory units, without
being committed to the sensorimotor loops being 100% mental in all their parts.
In short, the explanatory work done by transcranial kinds comes from their transcranial
nature. No additional bonus comes from the claim that the transcranial kinds are mental.
What is the explanatory edge in believing that Otto’s notebook ismental, over and above
believing it to be a psychologically-signicant feature for guiding his action? To achieve
the benets indicated by Clark and Chalmers, psychology only needs to be reformed to
include transcranial kinds.e additional assumption that transcranial kinds be mental
kinds is otiose.
19. One might object that because of a transcranial state’s psychologically-signicant commonalities
with internal states (e.g. it is action guiding, combines with internal desires in the right way, etc.), the
transcranial state ipso facto counts as mental.is is, in abbreviated form, the functionalist argument for
HEC: since the transcranial state satises some minimal functional specication to be a mental state, it
should count as a mental state. I argue at length against the functionalist argument, and the closely-related
parity principle, in Sprevak (2009). My concern here is to address whether IBE arguments lend any special,
independent, support to HEC. My claim is that they do not.e virtues canvassed by Clark and Chalmers
for HEC (unication, etc.) do not decide between HEC and HEMC since they are equally enjoyed by both
hypotheses.
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One might object that hybrid kinds are nevertheless undesirable, or at least less desirable,
than pure kinds. Hybrid kinds cross the boundary between natural kinds, in this case,
the mental/non-mental boundary. One may say that all else being equal, it is preferable
to preserve these natural kind structures in science. For example, one might argue that
in science we should prefer hypotheses that do not trac in ‘jade’, but rather distinguish
jadeite from nephrite. Similarly, one should prefer a hypothesis that does not deal in
hybrid mental/non-mental kinds in favour of one that deals in purely mental or purely
non-mental kinds. A hypothesis that groups things that are relevantly similar together,
and distinguishes things that are relevantly dierent, has an explanatory edge.
e problem with this objection is that it asserts that such an explanatory edge exists,
whereas we appear to have every reason to think that it does not. HEMC shows that we
can meet our explanatory obligations, and remain neutral on the question of mentality.
HEMC appears to show that there is no explanatory edge in preserving the natural kind
structure. If there are no explanatory benets, it simply does not matter whether one
preserves the relevant natural kind structure or not. Again, the case is like ‘jade’. If ‘jade’
were to play no explanatory role in science, it would not matter whether we call two
samples of rock ‘jade’ or not. Similarly, since the notion of mentality appears to play no
explanatory role above, there is no benet to be gained in using mental kinds over hybrid
kinds.e natural kind facts about which HEC and HEMC dier are just not doing any
explanatory work.
A more promising line of objection is to say that mental kinds are preferable to hybrid
kinds because positing purely mental kinds is, in some sense, the simpler option. Ap-
pealing to mental kinds yields explanations that employ fewer, or less complex, types
of entities. A uniformly mental story is simpler and more elegant than a relatively ugly
mixed psychological explanation based on hybrid kinds. I will bracket this concern until
Section 5, where I discuss it in the context of IBEs against HEC.
Clark (2007) has given two other IBEs for HEC, but it is hard to see how they fare any
better against HEMC.
e rst argument is based on cognitive impartiality.20e argument derives from recent
empirical work by Gray and Ballard.21 eir work appears to show that the brain does
not ‘care’ whether its operations are performed internally or externally, so long as they
satisfy some cost–benet function, which may not, and oen does not, privilege the skin
boundary.erefore, HEC has the virtue that it lets us see the boundaries of skin and skull
as the brain sees them: as functionally transparent. HEMC obscures the view by erecting
a barrier that the system itself does not care about. However, even if Clark’s interpretation
of the empirical work is correct, it is hard to see how this is an argument for HEC over
HEMC. It is no part of HEMC to deny that the brain can o-load operations onto the
external environment, or that such dependencies cannot be negotiated by a cost–benet
function.22 HEMC is compatible with seeing the division of labour between internal
activity and environmental resources as governed in the same way as HEC does, by a
cost–benet function that does not privilege the skin.e only dierence is that HEMC
20. Clark (2007), pp. 171–176, 190.
21. Gray and Fu (2004); Gray et al. (2006), Ballard, Hayhoe and Pelz (1995); Ballard et al. (1997).
22. Neither does HEMC claim that the division of labour is a conscious decision on the part of the agent,
or that it involves a Cartesianeatre. (Clark 2007, pp. 190–191)
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does not claim that the extra-cranial material is mental, whereas HEC claims that it is.
So it is not clear how a cost–benet explanation of the brain’s internal/external resource
switching is the property of HEC but not HEMC.
Clark’s second argument is based on self-stimulating loops.23 Clark claims that certain kinds
of causal relation to the environment, self-stimulating loops, are best understood as single
explanatory units in psychology, and therefore as entirely cognitive. A self-stimulating
loop is a process in which the agent creates output (speech, gesture, written words), which
is recycled as sensory input (hearing, touch, vision), which drives the cognitive process
along, producing with it more output. Clark’s analogy is with a turbo-charged engine:
exhaust ow from the engine is fed back into the engine in order to spin a compression
pump allowing for more powerful internal combustions and producing greater power.
Just as the whole turbo-charging cycle counts as part of the automobile’s power-generating
mechanism, so the whole self-stimulating loop should count as part of the agent’s cognitive
mechanism when explaining its successful action. But again, it is hard to see how this is
an argument for HEC over HEMC. Viewing a self-stimulating loop as a single explanatory
unit in psychology is compatible with HEMC as well as HEC.e dierence between the
two hypotheses is whether the loop involves exclusively mental kinds or a hybrid mix of
mental and non-mental kinds. And on this question, explanatory utility does not select
between HEC and HEMC.
5 Explanatory value arguments against HEC
Rupert (2004, 2009b) claims that there is a successful IBE against HEC. According to
Rupert, HEMC is a better explanatory hypothesis to HEC. Consequently, we should infer
HEMC’s truth and HEC’s falsity.e strategy is disconrmation by rival support. HEMC’s
truth, and HEC’s falsity, provides a better explanation of the empirical data in cognitive
science than HEC’s truth. So while Clark and Chalmers argue that explanatory concerns
support HEC, Rupert argues that explanatory concerns undermine HEC.
My claim is that both sides are mistaken. e failure of an IBE for HEC should give
no comfort to a critic who wishes to mount an IBE against HEC.e lesson from the
discussion above is not that HEMC wins the HEC/HEMC contest, but that an IBE based
on scientic practice is the wrong tool to decide between HEC and HEMC. A cognitive
scientist could swap between HEC and HEMC with negligible net change in explanatory
value. Neither HEC nor HEMC are clear explanatory winners, so one cannot use their
explanatory value as a guide to the truth.
Rupert argues that HEMC is explanatorily better than HEC because HEMC is a simpler
and more conservative hypothesis:
If the cases canvassed here are any indication, adopting HEC . . . at the very
best, yields only an unmotivated reinterpretation of results that can, at little
cost, be systematically accounted for within a more conservative framework.
(Rupert 2004, p. 390)
23. Clark (2007), pp. 183–185, p. 190.
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. . . all other things being equal, we should endorse HEMC over HEC, by dint
of the methodological principle of conservatism. (Rupert 2004, p. 395)
If HEMC accounts for the results that impress advocates of HEC, the more
conservative, simpler HEMC wins the day. (Rupert 2009b)
Conservativeness and simplicity are distinct virtues. Conservativeness is backward look-
ing: it speaks to a better t of the new theory with the old picture. Simplicity is sideways
looking: it speaks to the merits of the new theory with respect to other live current
alternatives. Let us consider each virtue in turn.
First, conservativeness. Rupert is right that HEMC is more conservative than HEC: HEC
departs from the traditional view by claiming that environmental features are mental,
while HEMC preserves the traditional internalist framework. However, it is unclear how
much weight should be accorded to this win, or even if it should weigh anything at all in
this debate.
First, the internalist view that HEMC preserves is primarily a product, not of empirical
science, but our folk conception of the mental. It would be a mistake to assume that
the traditional internalist picture is the output of a mature scientic theory. It is not so
much that the externalist question has been considered by science, and an internalist
answer given, but that the internalist conception has been imported into cognitive science
from prior folk conceptions of the mind. For the most part, the question concerning
HEC has not been explicitly considered by empirical science; no existing scientic theory
aims to answer the question. Internalism has been taken for granted in psychology in a
largely unargued for manner. Conservativeness is a virtue when one has good reasons
for believing the old theory, e.g. when the old theory is a tried and trusted scientic
theory. However, when the old view is just our folk conception in scientic clothing, it is
unclear that conservativeness with this view should weigh heavily at all. Indeed, there is
plenty of evidence that conservativeness with the folk conception has been a systematically
misleading guide to the truth in science. An argument for HEMC’s truth based solely on
its conservativeness oers imsy support to HEMC indeed.
Second, and more worryingly for Rupert, appeal to conservativeness to support HEMC is
tantamount to begging the question against HEC.e issue at stake is whether we should
reform our folk view in the way suggested by HEC.e reply on oer is that it ts better
with the folk conception not to reform, and hence by dint of the virtue of conservativeness,
we should preserve the old view. But the advocate of HEC already freely admits that her
view departs from folk conception—indeed, that is the point of her view.e question is
whether her new conception is true. Objecting that one thinks that she is wrong because
she is proposing reform, and one disfavours reform, is to fail to take her claim seriously.
One wants to know whether the proposed reform is true. Being told that it is reform is
not news. In short, it is already granted by both sides that HEC is less conservative then
HEMC. Some other explanatory virtue must come into play.erefore, an IBE against
HEC cannot be an IBE based on conservativeness.
Simplicity seems a more promising line of attack. Rupert claims that HEMC is more
parsimonious than HEC, and consequently that HEMC is the simpler hypothesis. Both
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HEC and HEMC posit the same causal processes and interactions between the brain
and external environment that are relevant to the explanation of cognition. However, in
addition HEC claims that some of these causal processes are extendedmental or cognitive
processes. Yet HEC appears to reap no explanatory rewards from this addition; as we
saw above, the same explanatory work can be done without any ontological ination.
If the extra content of HEC—appeal to specically mental or cognitive environmental
entities—does no extra work, we should prefer the more parsimonious HEMC.24
e problem with this argument is that whatever ontological economyHEMC buys it does
so at the cost of an increase in complexity elsewhere in the theory. We saw in Section 4
that an advocate of HEMC can employ explanations involving transcranial kinds, at the
cost of introducing hybrid kinds into her theory. Psychological theories that use hybrid
kinds involve neither wholly mental nor wholly non-mental predicates, they require a
new kind of predicate that does not t neatly on either side of the barrier: predicates that
reference hybrid kinds. HEMC requires adding new predicates to the psychological theory
and giving them a special treatment that diers from that of traditional psychologically-
signicant terms. is spares the ontology, but it complicates the theory. HEC avoids
adding this wrinkle to the theory. Rather than add mental, non-mental, and hybrid predic-
ates to the psychological theory, HEC allows one to take talk of psychologically-signicant
transcranial states (extended ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’) at face value, assimilating them under
the old categories of mental states.e choice is between adding new predicates to gain
a sparser ontology, or beeng up one’s ontology to include more mental ‘stu ’ while
recycling the old predicates.e dilemma should be familiar to any metaphysician with
naturalistic sympathies: ideological economy can be bought at the expense of ontological
economy, and ontological ination can be avoided at the expense of adding new primitive
predicates. (Is it better to add new primitive modal operators to one’s modal theory and
dispense with possible worlds, or use possible worlds to buy a theory leaner in modal
predicates?)25
e mere fact that there is a trade-o between ideology and ontology need not itself be
a problem.e problem is that in the case of HEC and HEMC it is completely unclear
how to manage the trade-o. Is it better to pare down ontology at the expense of mess
in the psychological theory, or embrace an inated ontology for a simpler treatment
of psychologically-signicant terms? e answer is unclear. Not only is it unclear, it is
unclear how the practice of cognitive science would ever informatively settle this dispute.
We appear, rather uncomfortably, not to be in a position to know how the explanatory
merits of the two positions should be balanced. Consequently, there is no IBE from
the parsimony of HEMC to the falsity of HEC. Parsimony has to be balanced against
theoretical simplicity, and once one attempts to do this, Rupert’s IBE against HEC stalls.
It is worth noting that in order for an IBE to fail, it is not necessary that there be zero
dierence in explanatory value between the two alternatives. All that is required is for
there to be no clear winner.is appears to the case here: both HEC and HEMC can take
24. Rupert (2004), p. 421: ‘If the general [HEC] notion of access to information adds any explanatory
power, it is too little to justify new ontological commitments.’ Rupert (2009b): ‘HEC explains the phenom-
ena by positing the same number of elements, the internal architecture, the interactive process, etc., then
lumps these parts together under the label “cognitive system”.is addition is gratuitous.’
25. For more on the interplay between ideology and ontology see Oliver (1996); Quine (1951).
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on each other’s explanatory work, but neither clearly, or knowably, trumps the other in
terms of explanatory value.e explanatory race between them is too close to call, and
it is hard to see how future evidence from cognitive science could settle it. A cognitive
scientist could, perfectly rationally, adopt either framework for her day-to-day work. A
persistent commitment to one framework over the other could be chalked up to individual
prejudice, entrenchment of existing viewpoint, desire for dierent kinds of neatness, or
an iconoclastic desire for revolutionary talk. None of these seem sucient to warrant an
inference to the truth or falsity of HEC.e conclusion is that IBE is the wrong tool to
decide between HEC and HEMC.e explanatory practice of cognitive science does not
have enough traction on the issue over which HEC and HEMC dier—the claim about
mental extension—to mount an IBE.
Rupert alleges that HEC incurs an additional and dierent type of explanatory cost: HEC
involves losing our grip of the human subject as a persisting and integrated system. Rupert
claims that this means psychology misses out on perfectly good explanations of cognitive
phenomena that are robustly exhibited across dierent environments: explanations in
terms of the capacities of an invariant and integrated human subject.26 However, as we
noted in Section 4, it is hard to see how this follows. HEC does not claim that we should
abandon traditional psychology, or stop treating humans as persisting and integrated
cognitive systems. It only claims that in addition to studying their internal mechanisms,
we should also study larger mechanisms as units of cognitive activity in their own right.
e mandate of HEC is to increase the explanatory scope of psychology, not to take old
explanations away.27
6 Conclusion
e debate about the explanatory value of HEC to cognitive science is not about whether
or not the mind extends.at issue is simply not sensitive to the explanatory practice of
cognitive science.e debate could be about whether transcranial kinds should be allowed
into cognitive science at all. Alternatively, it could be about whether the explanation of
cognitive processes should be a purely internal matter (à la HINT). But on both scores, it
seems that the externalist has already won. Transcranial kinds are already doing useful
work in psychology as the studies of Gray and Ballard show. And psychology no longer
assumes that cognition can wholly be explained in the internalist way envisaged by HINT.
However, the externalist’s prize claim—that the extra-neural material ismental—remains
untouched.is is the claim that attracted the lion’s share of the philosophical attention,
and if it were dropped much of the heat would go out of the debate.
We can also conclude, contraHurley, that appeal to the explanatory practice of cognitive
science cannot settle the causal–constitutive dispute. Hurley proposed that the line
between the non-mental causes of mental states and their mental constituents should
be drawn based on the explanatory practice of cognitive science. We now have strong
reasons to doubt that this strategy could succeed. Cognitive science is simply not sensitive
26. Rupert (2004), pp. 425-428; Rupert (2008); Rupert (2009b).
27. See Clark (2007), pp. 169–171. Adams and Aizawa (2007); Aizawa (2007) develop a further IBE
against HEC, based on Noë (2004), which I criticise in Sprevak (2009).
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to the dierence between the two options. Psychological theories can, at negligible cost,
be given either a causal gloss (via HEMC) or a constitutive gloss (via HEC). If, in a
particular case, psychology chooses to favour one gloss, the other is still available via a
trivial transform, and the reasons for a preference for one over the other appear to be more
likely to be idiosyncratic and accidental rather than tied to tracking the truth. Explanatory
practice cannot settle the issue between HEC and HEMC, a forteriori it cannot settle the
causal–constitutive issue. Explanatory properties are toothless as a way of demarcating
the causal–constitutive boundary.
Does this mean that the choice between HEC and HEMC is radically underdetermined?
Or worse, is the dispute between HEC and HEMC no more than a terminological ques-
tion with no empirical bearing on the world? I do not think that the dispute is merely
terminological. Interpreting the dispute between HEC and HEMC as merely a question
of terminology fails to take substantial issues seriously. What is a mental process? Where
are the cognitive agents? How far in space do they extend? e boundary between the
mental and the non-mental is a natural joint, something that exists no matter how we
choose to use our language. One cannot change facts about the distribution of mental
states merely by legislating changes in our language. It is this ontological question that
underlies the HEC/HEMC dispute. To say that the dierence between a notebook being
mental and non-mental is just a matter of the denition of the term ‘mental’ is to fail to
hear this question seriously. If one were to insist that the mental/non-mental distinction,
even in its ontological form, is nonetheless just a matter of denition, then one would
have travelled far from the thought that mentality is a natural, objective, and real feature
of the world.28
How then could we resolve the issue between HEC and HEMC? I believe that we need
to look not just to which hypothesis is endorsed by scientic practice, but to wider
considerations that inform what makes a state or a process mental or non-mental. In the
case of cognitive processes, we already have theories of the mental/non-mental contrast
in the form of various kinds of functionalism.ese theories aim to specify what makes
a state mental, at least for the non-qualitative, information-processing, aspects of our
cognitive life. For example, a functionalist theory of belief may attempt specify what
makes a causal state a belief. One might look to these theories of the mental/non-mental
distinction to settle the HEC/HEMC dispute. In Sprevak (2009), I argue that rather than
yielding a sensible answer, these theories tend to blow up when considering this particular
problem.is does not show that we should give up and look elsewhere for answers, such
as the explanatory practice of science. Rather, it shows that we need to rethink those
theories carefully to avoid their failure in these cases. is process of remoulding our
theories of mentality should be guided by more than just by the contingencies of the
28. A more reasonable reading of the terminology worry is to claim that our concepts of mentality, as
they stand, are not adequate to the task of selecting between the two hypotheses. We need to revise our
concepts to deal with the cases raised by cognitive extension, and perhaps the existing categories of mental
and non-mental are too crude. I have considerable sympathy with this response, but it raises the problem of
howwe should reform our concepts of mentality. My point is that this cannot be just a matter of convention;
one cannot simply legislate what counts as mental and what does not. Reform should be answerable to
evidential concerns, and it is a puzzle where the evidence should come from if not from the practice of
cognitive science. I argue that we should look wider for evidence, including our intuitions about merely
possible cases.
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practice of cognitive science.ere are wider concerns relevant to a theory of mentality
that have the potential to break a deadlock between HEC and HEMC.ese include our
judgements about merely possible cases of mentality and cognitive agents.e project of
remoulding should be seen in the round, with empirical concerns informing in complex
ways both intuitions about possible cases and the explanatory practice of cognitive science.
e way forward is to acknowledge that whether something counts as mental depends on
broader exigences than just the explanatory practice of cognitive science.
Clark says that ‘the cure for cognitive hiccups [between HEC and HEMC] is to stop
worrying and enjoy the ride’.29 Clark claims that the interplay between HEC and HEMC
has been, and is, a productive force in cognitive science ‘apt to draw attention to certain
features . . . while making it harder to spot others’.30 However, this mistakes the genuine
explanatory inferences driving the debate in cognitive science.e real rivals, as far as
cognitive science is concerned, are not HEC and HEMC, or indeed any claims about the
extent of the mental, but two dierent explanatory frameworks for understanding the
mind: internal self-suciency (INT) and external dependence (EXT). It is the oscillation
between these distinctively explanatory models that has been the force behind cognitive
science:
int Mental processes are largely self-sucient, and can be studied largely in isolation
from environmental props.
ext Mental processes depend intimately on environmental resources, and should be
studied within the context of those resources.
Some cognitive phenomena are best seen under INT, some are best seen under EXT.
Understood right, the embedded turn in cognitive science has been a therapeutic series
of hiccups between INT and EXT. However, in order to settle the question in which Clark
is interested—the extent of mental states and processes—we have to look elsewhere for
answers, and to our best theories of the mental/non-mental contrast.
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